joint operational warfare theory and practice pdf

Joint Operational Warfare Theory And Practice Pdf

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[Download PDF] Joint Operational Warfare Theory and Practice and V. 2 Historical Companion

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Jump to Page. Search inside document. I am less in charge of the latter than the former. Space we can recover, lost time never. Napoleon I Space, time, and force are closely and dynamically interrelated. An operational commander must often take high risks in emphasizing one of these operational factors over another. Overcoming space always entails costs in time and force: conversely, giving up space can save time and force.

Hence, balancing the operational factors in combination is an extremely complicated problem. Overcoming the factor of space involves movement of forces, effects of fires, and transmittal of messages and orders. Yet, if the defender has the same or similar forces, then the time the attacker needs to overcome the factor of space will be much longer.

Overcoming that distance with internal combustion engines proved to be false expectation in Russia in Heat, dust, poor roads, marshy terrain, and too few stops for repairs wreaked much havoc with German armor and motorized equipment. The German army equipment was much too heavy for warfare in Russian terrain.

The Germans needed days to reach the outskirts of Moscow, or a rate of advance of 4. In contrast, the Germans fought their way from the Ardennes to the English Channel—over miles—in just twelve days, or nineteen miles per day. A sound force-to-space ratio is one of the most critical factors in planning a major operation or campaign.

This relationship becomes increasingly more important the longer the hostilities last, the greater the expanse of space involved, and the more stringent the limitations on resources. The smaller the forces, the smaller the space that will be selected and the smaller the physical objectives to be accomplished.

The theater of operations was in the form of an irregular triangle extending some miles along the north-south axis, potentially allowing the Germans to conduct a series of enveloping concentric operations.

However, the entire space was too wide for the German forces used in the campaign. Because of the relatively large distances, the tactical actions in a given location would not necessarily have the desired synchronized effect on the events in other areas of the theater.

The Germans divided the available space between the two army groups totaling five armies. The rapid advance of the Tenth Army from Silesia toward Warsaw in only eight days split the theater into two parts.

The panzer and motorized infantry divisions of the Fourth Army moving from Pomerania reached the Vistula River at Graudenz [Grudziadz] in a few days. The Germans also carried out the second envelopment in which one panzer group of the Third Army in Eastern Prussia advanced southeast to meet the Fourteenth Army on the Vistula River near Cracow Krakow.

Thus, the German forces advancing from the south to north isolated the Polish capital of Warsaw from the east and sealed its fate. The effect of the peculiar characteristics of terrain or water surface over which they move must be evaluated as well. Each must be considered individually and in combination.

Terrain also considerably affects the size of force required to accomplish a given objective. In general, the more difficult the terrain, the larger the attacking force that is required. In the Winter War of the Russo-Finnish border stretched for about 1, miles. This allowed the Finns to concentrate their strongest forces on the Karelian Isthmus and in the area immediately north of Ladoga to prevent the outflanking of the Mannerheim Line.

The factor of force is inherently difficult to calculate precisely because so many unmeasurable factors—such as morale, training, and leadership—fall within its scope. However, large numbers of troops or other forces always have their own qualities and should not be dismissed outright.

In general, the size of forces should be roughly in proportion to the space they must control or obtain, A mismatch between size of physical space and strength of forces is almost always fatal. A given space must be controlled so that the principal purpose of a major operation or campaign is accomplished.

The successful campaign or major operation always results in enlarging the existing space for subsequent operations. Most often the greater the force-to-space ratio, the smaller the space available to an enemy for recovery after combat action, However, sometimes, a small but highly mobile foree with high combat potential can operate in a large space and defeat a numerically superior force.

In the ancient era, small and mobile armies operated successfully over large spaces and eventually controlled larger territories.

Alexander the Great had fewer than 40, men in his campaign against Persia in B. Hannibal at Cannae in B. C had approximately 50, men in the field.

Frederick the Great deployed an army of about , men. Tt was not until the nineteenth century that ,man armies operated in a theater. The Russian forces, totaling , men, were dispersed over such a large territory that only , troops were in direct opposition to the French army.

In six weeks he advanced about miles, and extended his frontline about miles from Riga via Vitebsk to the Rokitno Marshes Napoleon I's losses from combat and lack of food amounted to about one third of his initial strength. After three and a half months of fighting, Napoleon I's main force numbered , men. Meanwhile, the troops assigned to protect the single line of communications totaled , men.

By September, the French had to defend a mile supply line from Russian attack on all sides. Only 30, French troops were available in Riga and on the upper Dvina to protect the to mile-long flanks.

Despite his victory, the state of his troops did not allow him to resume fighting, and he ordered a general withdrawal from Russia on 18 October. The Soviets in their war with Finland in wrongly believed that they had a favorable space-to-force ratio. They also had aircraft versus only Finnish aircraft. Neither did the Japanese fully consider the factor of space in planning their invasion of China in They erroneously viewed China as encompassing only the area from Peking Beijing to the Yellow River and from Shanghai to Nanking, instead of the entire Chinese territory.

The Japanese objective was to seize control of the five Provinees in northern China through the employment of fifteen divisions, each of about 20, men. Initially committing too few forces for the task at hand, they could not achieve a quick and decisive victory despite eventually deploying twice that number of forces into China. If the Japanese had properly calculated the factor of space and planned their forces correspondingly, the war in China would have probably taken a more favorable turn for them, Historically, the force-to-space ratio in land warfare has undergone many changes.

In the first three years of the American Civil War, a nominal number of 12, fighting men were used to hold a Confederate defensive position around Richmond. As methods of defense improved, this figure dropped to about 5, men holding a mile of front against an enemy with double that strength. In World War 1, because of greatly improved methods of defense, the force-to-space ratio was still lower.

The Germans in had a nominal ratio of one division for every five miles of front or 3, men to a mile , while along the main part of the front the ratio was about 6, men to a mile. By the Allies had deployed divisions along the Western Front, while the Germans had ; a year later, the ratio was to divisions, respectively.

Nevertheless, all attempts by the Allies to penetrate the German lines failed and resulted in great Allied losses, In World War Il, the force-to-space ratio varied from theater to theater. In May the Allies defended some miles of front in France with divisions, or approximately one division to three and a half miles of front.

The Germans had an extremely favorable space-to-force ratio where it counted most, in the sector of main effort and the selected point of main attack—the area between Sedan and Dinant, In the German sector of main effort, the French deployed twenty-nine divisions to hold nearly one hundred miles of front, while the Germans deployed forty-two divisions of their crack Army Group A. General Montgomery attacked this force with a superiority of eight-to-one.

In the process, the Allies lost three les as many tanks as the defending Germans. On the ten-mile front of the U. For most f the time during this defensive fighting, the Germans held the eighty-mile stretch of formandy with the equivalent of only one division to each eight miles of the front, The USS. The German high command never did an estimate of the situation for the entire German armed forces, nor did they seriously consider the factors of space, time, and force in their long-range planning.

The Germans accepted these disadvantages, despite the fact that the risk was bound to increase as the space they Progressively filled became larger and the number of troops was reduced. By the end of IDA. The German overall strength was about tighty-three division-equivatents—a reduction of forty-seven divisions from. Hitler's directive in the summer of —to seize the Caucasian oilfields and Stalingrad—resulted in changing the shape of the frontline in the south from a to mile-long line to a 1,mile forvard-protruding salient.

In their invasion of Russia in , the Germans faced the problem of the enormous distances to be scized and controlled. The distance from the German starting positions on the Bug River to the Orsha Corridor some sixty-eight miles southwest of Smolensk was about miles, while to the Volga it was about 1, miles. However, this Proved insufficient to counterbalance the growing space-to-force disparity, By , the frontage of a German infantry division has increased to thirty miles, or one defender for every thirty yards.

The mismatch between the factors of space and force were exacerbated for the Germans in World War I because they had to deploy forces along almost the entire rim of the European continent, from northern Norway to Greece against possible Allied invasion or large-scale raids. Before the Allied Normandy invasion in June , the Germans had in the West only sixty divisions of varied quality. The Italian theater of operations extended for about miles along its north-south axis and the Allies employed, at most, fifteen to twenty divisions, while the Germans used only sixteen divisions another ten divisions were tied to the Balkans.

The Germans offered stubbom resistance until the very end of the war.

Operational Warfare Sea Theory Practice Cass

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Joint Operational Warfare Theory and Practice and V. 2, Historical Companion

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Historical Companion. Per Gli Ist.

3 comments

Kristi91

Perhaps, but in which the connection with Walpole could no doubt be traced.

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