Game Theory And National Security Pdf
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Deterrence theory is the idea that an inferior force, by virtue of the destructive power of the force's weapons, could deter a more powerful adversary if the force could be protected against destruction by a surprise attack. The doctrine gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons and is related to but distinct from the concept of mutual assured destruction , which models the preventative nature of full-scale nuclear attack that would devastate both parties in a nuclear war. Deterrence is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action that has not yet started by means of threat of reprisal,  or to prevent it from doing something that another state desires.
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- Game Theory and National Security
- National security games
Issues that arise in using game theory to model national security problems are discussed, including positing nation-states as players, assuming that their decision makers act rationally and possess complete information, and modeling certain conflicts as two-person games.
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Not a MyNAP member yet? Register for a free account to start saving and receiving special member only perks. Intelligence analysts are often asked to identify the likely—and unlikely—consequences of alternative courses of action for specific, real-time foreign policy problems. With limited time and potentially critical consequences, analysts must sort through the uncertainties surrounding the specific problem, providing a best estimate of what is likely to happen, estimating the probability of outcomes different from the best estimate, and assessing contingencies that might lead to alternative outcomes. In each instance, there is an interest to work through the logic of a situation to ascertain what might be done to alter or to facilitate particular outcomes.
For many Americans in the late s and early s, game theory was a way for scientists, in collusion with the US government, to prevent nuclear exchange by conceptualizing the Cold War as a game, and by playing this game according to specific rational strategies. The first part of the essay describes how the game theory narrative popularized the idea that the rationality of pure mathematics could be applied to manage some major threats of the Cold War—the menace of an unknown enemy and the specter of an accidental nuclear exchange. The following sections explore how this narrative was both exemplified and criticized by a variety of creative works and other artifacts of Cold War culture. Project MUSE promotes the creation and dissemination of essential humanities and social science resources through collaboration with libraries, publishers, and scholars worldwide. Forged from a partnership between a university press and a library, Project MUSE is a trusted part of the academic and scholarly community it serves. Built on the Johns Hopkins University Campus.
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Game Theory and National Security
Issues that arise in using game theory to model national security problems are discussed, including positing nation-states as players, assuming that their decision makers act rationally and possess complete information, and modeling certain conflicts as two-person games. A generic two-person game called the Conflict Game, which captures strategic features of such variable-sum games as Chicken and Prisoners' Dilemma, is then analyzed. Unlike these classical games, however, the Conflict Game is a two-stage game in which each player can threaten to retaliate — and carry out this threat in the second stage — if its opponent chose noncooperation in the first stage. Conditions for the existence of different pure-strategy Nash equilibria, or stable outcomes, are found, and these results are extended to situations in which the players can select mixed strategies i.
National security games
После чего вошел в номер и включил свет. Немец не ожидал такого оборота. - Wasmachst… - Помолчите! - Беккер перешел на английский. - У вас в номере проститутка? - Он оглядел комнату. Роскошная обстановка, как в лучших отелях.
Я жду. Бринкерхофф застонал, сожалея, что попросил ее проверить отчет шифровалки. Он опустил глаза и посмотрел на ее протянутую руку.
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Я возьму такси. - Однажды в колледже Беккер прокатился на мотоцикле и чуть не разбился. Он больше не хотел искушать судьбу, кто бы ни сидел за рулем. - Как скажете.
Лаборатория вне закона? - спросила Сьюзан. - Это что за фрукт. Соши пожала плечами. - Открыть. Ну и ну, - ужаснулась .